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STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY POLICY
FOR EASTERN EUROPE
Slavo Radosevic 
In this paper I apply the concept of strategic technology policy (STRTP), originally
developed by Justman and Teubal, to the East European situation. I view strategic
technology policy as an indispensable bridge between science policy, industrial policy
and competition policy. Strategic technology policy means explicit targeting for the
improvement of technological and related capabilities, based on co-ordination between
groups of enterprises and government. The concept is discussed in the context of three
dierent theoretical approaches to technology policy|neo-classical, transaction costs
and evolutionary.
The analysis is then applied to the example of Croatia, on the basis of which
I generalize and apply the STRTP concept, distinguishing between three groups of
industries which dier regarding the loci of their technological capabilities|production
know-how based, engineering based and R&D based. I conclude that STRTP must be
based primarily in the evolutionary approach, but that in Eastern Europe it should
incorporate some of the features of transaction costs and neo-classical approaches.
1. Introduction
The East European countries1 are currently faced with the task of formulating
technology policies which will be closely linked to their industrial capabili-
ties and will improve their competitive positions. S&T policies based on the
notion of compensating for market failure do not on the whole address the
kind of problems that East European countries face. The concept of strategic
technology policy (STRTP) oers a theoretical basis for a policy approach that
tackles the structural blockages and strategic choices that dominate the agenda
in Eastern Europe today. The STRTP concept is not a theoretical inventum,
but a piece of ex post theorising derived from existing policy practice in OECD
 Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RF, United
Kingdom. This paper is part of an ongoing project on: The Role of S&T Policy in the
Economic Transformation of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, supported by
the Leverhulme Trust. I am grateful to Chris Freeman, Nick von Tunzelmann, Keith Pavitt,
Margaret Sharp, David Dyker and Richard Nelson for very useful comments on earlier versions
of this paper. I alone am responsible for any remaining errors and omissions.
1 Eastern Europe denotes here the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and excludes
the countries of the former Soviet Union.
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countries, which is in turn based on the new relationships that have emerged
between government, industry and universities. The most notable examples
are the EC programs ESPRIT, JESSI, OMI (Open microprocessor initiative),
and the British ALVEY program, as well as the well-known Japanese VLSI
project and Korean DRAM program.
Strategic technology policy is explicit targeting for the improvement of tech-
nological and related capabilities based on the co-ordination of groups of com-
panies and government.2 It is strategic in the sense that its formulation and
implementation is based on interaction between rms, or between rms, uni-
versities and government.3
While the activist type of industrial policy focuses on selected industries,
STRTP concentrates on targeting decient capabilities.4 In conditions of in-
creasing marginalization of Eastern European S&T systems, STRTP is a con-
ceptual attempt to give them more direct relevance, in the context of a pre-
dominantly laisser faire atmosphere.
In the next section I set up the theoretical framework for discussing tech-
nology policy. Three dierent theoretical approaches to technology policy are
discussed|neo-classical, transaction cost and evolutionary. Then the STRTP
idea is applied to the examples of a few Croatian industrial sectors. In the last
part I elaborate on the main issues that the application of STRTP in East-
ern Europe might raise. The concept is further developed by applying it to
three groups of industries which we distinguish on the basis of locus of techno-
logical capabilities|R&D based, engineering based and production know-how
based.
2. The problem of capability enhancement in the policy context of
Eastern Europe
2.1. Incentives, institutions and capabilities
The problem of development policy formation in Eastern Europe has so far
been conned to the dimension of macroeconomic policy. The dominant policy
advice has been as follows: free prices, remove subsidies, open the economy to
international trade, make the currency convertible, privatize public enterprises,
and invite in foreign investors. This, it has been argued, will produce an
2 The concept is developed theoretically by Justman and Teubal (1992).
3 STRTP should not be confused with policy to support strategic technologies. The
term \strategic" here refers to the interactions of various agents which jointly determine
policy outcomes, as in \strategic" trade theory. It connotes primarily strategic intentions.
Obviously the eects of the programs may be much less than originally intended. In other
words, strategic intentions and interactions may end up as merely tactical improvements for
the companies involved, for the most part conned to the R&D function.
4 Justman and Teubal (1992, p. 1) dene STRTP as a policy which targets technology
infrastructure, rather than industries.
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intensive marketization process. And it cannot be denied that in practice an
irreversible process of economic change, much shaped by these principles, has
indeed been launched.
However, the process of marketization is unfolding at a much slower pace
than originally expected, particularly as regards privatization. This has led to
widespread re-examination of the theoretical basis of standard policy advice
to Eastern Europe. It has become clear that the institutional requirements for
the market economy have been seriously underestimated. More concretely, the
state of institutional vacuum has deepened a crisis that would in any case have
been extremely profound.
This neglect of the institutional basis of the market economy originates
from the perception of that construct as a `pure market economy', where there
is no explicit place for active social and political actors. In practice, markets
are not abstract spaces, but rather the product of society, and of institutional
development processes. Recognition of the role of institutions has led us beyond
the old slogan of \getting the prices right", to a new one of \getting (at least
some) institutions right" [Winiecki (1992)], and also to an explicit recognition
of the need for policy to oset \institution failure" [Sharp and Pavitt (1993)].
The institution-creating issues are now increasingly seen as critically relevant
to the business of building market economies in this region.
However, from a technology perspective, a policy framework which com-
prises only incentives and institutions is insucient|for it neglects the third
dimension|the role of capabilities.5 Enterprises may have certain capabilities
which enable them to react faster to given incentives within a given insti-
tutional setting. It is these capabilities that ultimately determine what can
be achieved. It is clear that, in the long run, economic growth is the result of
the interplay between incentives and capabilities, moulded through institutions
[OECD (1987)]. Let us now look at these elements in greater detail.
1) Incentives are shaped primarily by macroeconomic policy and derive from
prices.
2) Capabilities are shaped primarily by educational, industrial and technology
policy, and represent economic competencies which enable the identication,
expansion and exploitation of the opportunity set.
5 Even the recent literature on strategic management does not pay particular attention
to capabilities. The so-called \competitive forces approach" in strategic management [Porter
(1990)], which is rooted in the \structure-conduct-performance" paradigm, presumes that
capabilities per se do not pose a problem, since \the smart money will back the guys who
are able to put pieces together" [Teece et al. (1990)]. Consequently, the argument contin-
ues, enterprises should worry only about how to get into good strategic position to defend
themselves against competitive forces or to inuence them in their favour. \The dynamic
capabilities" approach developed by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1990), in contrast, predicates
that strategic change, which is value-augmenting, is dicult and costly to perform. The
underlying argument is that capabilities must be built|they cannot be bought.
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3) Institutions are the end-products of institutional transformation and adap-
tation and shape or are shaped by the above two components (see Figure 1).6

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policy order
policy process
Institution building-up
(institutions)
Macro-economic policy
(incentives)
Science, technology
and industrial policy
(capabilities)
Figure 1
The elements of transition policy
It is clear that without strong incentives, i.e. a set of competitive prices,
capabilities cannot be used and upgraded. It is equally true that without ca-
pabilities incentives cannot operate. Institutions, in turn, set the rules of the
game and modify incentives and capabilities. In short, there is mutual depen-
dence of institutional conditions (order policy) and macro economic policies
and micro economic policies/reactions (process policy). All three components
are essential ingredients of a \virtuous circle" in which processes of learning
are reinforced by a stable macro economy and a congenial institutional setting.
Reviewing the current standard policy advice package to Eastern Europe in
the context of this \incentives, capabilities, institutions" framework, we may
conclude that in the sequence of policy options a stable macro economy and
a corresponding institutional basis are necessary rst steps. However, they
do not, by themselves, rebuild the real economy. In practice, the process of
marketization and institutional development will be constrained by the extent
to which capabilities are upgraded. The eect of any set of market incentives on
enterprises will remain limited, as long as the latter remain unable to respond
6 These categories are primarily analytical. In practice it is very dicult to separate
them. For example price systems, especially prices of labour and capital, are institutionally
embedded, and cannot be readily changed without changing the institutions. Equally, it is
dicult to separate institutions from technologies. See Sorge (1993).
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to them in an ecient way. Policies that enforce processes of restructuring on a
micro level, and which address problems of rms' capabilities, are as important
as macro policy. This makes technology and industrial policy an indispensable
input into the transition process.7
2.2. Science policy, industrial policy and (strategic) technology policy
In the last sub-section I dened technology policy as being focused on the
dimension of capabilities. However, science policy and industrial policy also
target this area.
Science policy deals with the science base, therefore not necessarily with
production and technological capabilities. It is, however, crucial in its im-
pact on the science system. The overmanned and inecient science system in
Eastern European countries badly needs a new science policy. The enforced
downscaling of R&D systems in these countries exerts strong pressure for rad-
ical transformation. It is, nevertheless, primarily in rms and sectors that the
problem of weak capabilities in the economies in transition is located. To the
extent that the science base is decisive in upgrading production and technolog-
ical capabilities, however, it plays an important role. The role of the science
base varies greatly between sectors, and there are clear limits to the extent
to which science policy can, by itself, be relied upon as a mechanism for the
technological regeneration of Eastern Europe.8
Industrial policy is a very loose term, covering a wide set of activities ori-
ented towards specic industries and rms. During the seventies, industrial
policy was focused on alleviating the consequences of structural change by as-
sisting the process of demise of sunset industries, primarily in Western Europe
[Cowling and Thomas (1990)]. Its very specic, activist application in East
Asian countries has certainly contributed to structural change in these coun-
tries. It is very unlikely, however, that it could be applied in Eastern Europe
in this activist form. It could be applied as neutral industrial policy.9
Neutral industrial policy is relevant to Eastern Europe in that it tries to syn-
thesise two approaches to growth|the modied structuralist (import substitu-
tion, massive protection, intervention on a micro level), and the neo-classical or
liberal (export orientation, foreign trade liberalisation, \hands-o" approach).
The neutral industrial policy approach admits that structural change is central
to the growth process, and also that an export-oriented and liberal approach
7 Technology and industrial policy are here understood, not as normative policies, but
as sets of activities, under various institutional labels, which focus on improving rm-level
capabilities.
8 I am not talking about innovation policy here. I see that as a comprehensive notion
that tries to capture the importance of \non-technology" policies (trade, education, compe-
tition, etc. policies) for technological development. This comprehensiveness is both the main
strength and the main weakness of the concept of innovation policy. It seems dicult to
operationalize, and I see its value primarily as a kind of \awareness raising" concept.
9 The concept of `neutral' industrial policy is elaborated in Justman and Teubal (1988).
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necessarily limits the role of government in correcting the operation of mar-
ket forces and promoting structural change. This implies correction, support
and stimulation, rather than substitution of market forces. The neutral ap-
proach argues that government should support the improvement of quality
of key inputs|education and training, telecommunications infrastructure, in
addition to oering technical assistance, access to cheap capital, etc. How-
ever, these should not be dierentiated by sectors|that is the force of the
\neutral"|but only by activities (capabilities). Subsidies are oered for any
project proposed by enterprises that satisfy minimal conditions. This ensures
that relative protabilities of enterprises are not changed. At this point, how-
ever, it becomes increasingly dicult to separate industrial from technology
policy.
Strategic technology policy diers from the conventional notion of technol-
ogy policy in its shift of emphasis from infrastructure and science to rms.
The more conventional approach may be termed general technology policy.10
It is general in the sense that it is not addressed to specic groups or sectors,
and it oers or supports freely available information (e.g. general infrastruc-
ture). It usually encompasses the building-up of the general education and
science infrastructure, and neutral instruments like R&D tax credits, grants
for innovation, pre-competitive R&D and innovation infrastructure which are
applied irrespective of sectors.11 STRTP, by contrast, addresses the capabil-
ities of enterprises explicitly, and supports the creation of knowledge that is
very localized or semi-proprietary.
Whereas general technology policy is not very much concerned with enter-
prise behaviour, because it is \rm neutral", STRTP is based explicitly on the
reactions of enterprises, and on strategic interactions of rms and governments.
The rm is not seen as an isolated entity, but as an organism that feeds itself
by interacting with its surrounding environment. STRTP assumes that the
behaviour of an individual company is part of a pattern of collective behaviour
that can be induced or co-ordinated, even though the company retains full in-
dependence. Strategic response on the part of companies is the very essence of
the strategic technology policy concept.
The instruments of general technology policy provide a workable solution
in a stable macroeconomic situation, where the dominant problems are of a
purely tactical or evolutionary character. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, R&D
tax credits, for example, will not re-orient companies strategically, however
extensively they are applied. Financial incentives for R&D and innovation
do not meet the need for co-ordination and strategic negotiation. In Eastern
Europe today, uncertainties and risks are too big to be resolved by generalized,
tactical policy instruments.
10 A similar distinction is used by Dosi; see UNCTAD (1993).
11 This neutrality is in practice very conditional. Usually such measures favour big rms
which are able to bear the high governance (transaction) costs of participating in such
programs.
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The importance of STRTP stems from the observation, supported by the
recent empirical work, that competitive advantages of countries arise not only
from general factors (education, science), but also from specic factors (sector-
specic, specialized knowledge) [Porter (1990)]. These cannot be addressed by
activities focused on general infrastructure and general instruments.
2.3. Market failure, strategic uncertainty and interdependence as theoretical
justications for technology policy
The proposition that policies addressing problems of rms' capabilities be given
the same weight as macro economic policy and institutional development for
macro economic policy will meet with very little opposition. Where disagree-
ment will appear is in regard to the type and the extent of such policies. I shall
briey present three theoretical perspectives that may serve as justication for
very specic policy practice in Eastern Europe. These perspectives are based
on the neo-classical, transaction cost and evolutionary frameworks.
2.3.1. The neo-classical justication for technology policy
Based as it is on the Pareto optimality criterion of welfare maximization, this
framework recognises the inability of perfect markets eciently to allocate re-
sources with public goods components, i.e. where there are signicant external
economies.12 In such cases \market failure" occurs because economic agents
cannot appropriate all the benets from investment in these \goods"|which
leads to under-investment [Nelson (1959); Arrow (1962)]. In cases where the
market mechanism is not the best allocator of resources, neo-classical theory
accepts that intervention, in the form of subsidies and tax relief, is legitimate.
As information is also a commodity with public good characteristics, this must
apply to S&T as well.
Applying the \market failure" argument to Eastern Europe would limit the
scope of policy to support for those activities that can be considered public
goods, i.e. basic research, the S&T infrastructure, education etc.
12 Bator's (1958) classic analysis of the problem shows that \market failure" is an endemic
and pervasive phenomenon, not conned to the public goods component. He denes an ex-
ternality in terms of \any situation where some Paretian costs and benets remain external
to decentralised cost revenue calculations in terms of prices." Using his analysis of market
failure, we may argue that perfect markets may fail to recognise all the benets and costs
of technological change on account of three types of externalities. The rst is caused by the
character of information as a good with a public component (market failure by existence).
Additional information consumption will not lead to a loss for other users, since marginal
costs of use are zero. The second externality arises out of incomplete ownership over infor-
mation on account of signicant spillovers and the impossibility of full protection (failure
by enforcement). The third cause of market failure stems from indivisibilities of technical
information and knowledge (failure by structure). Since, however, these arguments pose
more questions than they provide answers from the neo-classical perspective, we will conne
ourselves to the \orthodox" understanding of the neo-classical perception of \market failure".
94 slavo radosevic
2.3.2. The transaction costs justication for technology policy
The transaction cost school perceived that a world in which the main problem is
to satisfy Pareto welfare criteria is a world without transaction costs. Coase's
theorem demonstrates that the argument for public intervention on grounds
of market failure is logically inconsistent, in that it compares a world with
zero transaction costs with a world with transaction costs [Demsetz (1969);
Dahlman (1979)].13
Once we assume, realistically, a world with transaction costs, then the lia-
bility assignments and ownership rights start to have eects on the allocation
of resources. In a transaction costs world the very idea that there is a norm
against which potential intervention can be judged loses ground.
In that context, the privateness or publicness of a given activity ceases to
be an inherent characteristic. Since appropriability of innovations is dependent
on the system of property rights, the proper areas for technology policy will to
a great extent depend on the way regulations that enforce appropriability are
structured. For example, if patent legislation is rather weak, there is no point
in just taking general measures to stimulate innovation. On the other hand, if
patent law is too restrictive, diusion might be seriously hampered.
The transaction cost view provides justication for government action that
cuts down costs of interaction between rms. Any kind of strategic co-
ordination that reduces uncertainty among agents, as well as any activity that
reduces search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs and polic-
ing and enforcement costs, is legitimate.
Co-operative R&D programs, private provision of public programs like ven-
ture capital schemes, consultancies and so on, can be justied on the basis of
potential transaction costs reductions. The transactions cost approach thus
oers justication for a wide range of public/private mechanisms in technology
policy, in areas where the neo-classical perception of clearly dened \public
goods" tends to lose its meaning.
The transaction cost approach sees the main problem of allocative e-
ciency as an informational problem. As institutions are in essence uncertainty-
reducing structures, we may claim that this approach is focused on only two
dimensions|incentives and institutions. The power of the approach lies in its
recognition of the mutual dependence of incentives and institutions, and in
the abandonment of the idea of \optimal" behaviour, on the grounds that the
world is transaction-cost constrained. However, the approach says less about
dynamic problems and the role of policy in promoting structural change. In fact
the transaction cost theory may be best seen as a static framework, useful for
analysis of short-term problems. At a certain level, when all the possibilities of
increasing allocative eciency through reduction of transaction costs or estab-
13 It is puzzling that the bulk of the literature on technology policy avoids any reference
to transaction costs in analysis of the Arrow type of argument as a basis for policy.
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lishment of appropriate organizational forms (markets, hierarchies, networks)
are exhausted, this approach reaches its limits.14
2.3.3. The evolutionary framework for technology policy
The evolutionary approach recognises potential interdependencies and com-
plementarities and their dynamic eects when coupled with the appropriate
incentives and organizational forms. However, the most important novelty of
evolutionary theory is the idea that these interactive mechanisms, of which
prices are only one, occur in a world where capabilities cannot be reduced to
the possession of information, since knowledge is to a great extent tacit and
local, and as such inseparable from the organizations from which it derives
[Foray (1993)]. The emphasis is on dynamic and diusion eects generated by
the coupling of interdependencies and incentives. The implicit policy recom-
mendation goes beyond strategic co-ordination to reduce uncertainties, as in
the transaction costs approach, to encompass activities that strengthen com-
plementarities and connectivity within the S&T system, and between it and the
economy. In short, any policy that improves the economy's dynamic eciency
is legitimate in the mirror of evolutionary theory.
2.3.4. Neo-classical, transaction cost and evolutionary approaches in compar-
ative perspective
Coming back to our conceptual|\incentives, capabilities, institutions"|
framework (Figure 1), we see that the neo-classical framework connes itself to
incentives, that the transaction cost framework explicitly addresses both incen-
tives and institutions, while the evolutionary framework encompasses feedbacks
(positive and negative) between incentives, institutions and capabilities, as well
as these categories in themselves. What do these dierences mean in practical
policy terms?
There are a priori cases which qualify for intervention from a market failure
perspective, but not from a transaction cost point of view. These are the cases
where the costs of intervention may exceed the potential welfare eects, even
though from a market failure point of view the intervention is justied. By
the same token, we may nd cases where action is not justied from a market
failure point of view, but where external and multiplicative eects are such
that intervention is justied from a long-term, evolutionist, point of view.
Neo-classical and evolutionary views both recognise the role of externali-
ties. However, for the former these are deviations from an attainable optimum
(Pareto relevant externalities), while for the latter they are sources of potential
14 Langlois (1992) oers a rare attempt to develop transaction costs theory as a dynamic
concept. The dynamism comes from the notion of dynamic governance costs. These are the
costs of transferring capability, or the costs of not having the capability you need when you
need it. This approach clearly tends to fusion with the evolutionary approach.
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dynamic growth. The transaction cost view, on the other hand, questions the
very existence of externalities, in recognising only those externalities which can-
not be internalized through alternative property arrangements, i.e. Pareto ir-
relevant externalities. A transaction costs approach would investigate whether
those interested in the results of inventions could negotiate with inventors and
compensate them for increased \production". The neo-classical view would
take the current state of aairs as \normal", and seek to determine whether
support for inventors could be justied on grounds of externalities. Support
for S&T infrastructure would be evaluated from the neo-classical view on a
cost/benet basis, while the evolutionary view would seek to take into account
the dynamic and multiplicative eects that such investment might have.
Whereas the \market failure" approach is only concerned with price distor-
tions and with the nancial interventions needed to correct these, the evolu-
tionary is concerned with all aspects of structural blockage or strategic choice
in industry. The focus of market failure based policy is on corrective taxes and
subsidies, to the detriment of the potential co-ordinating role of the govern-
ment or business associations. Co-ordination from the evolutionary viewpoint
should be understood in a broader sense to encompass a wide range of in-
formal mechanisms or associations which function as mechanisms of economic
articulation [Robertson (1992)]. These mechanisms (consumer and producers'
associations, enterprise-university associations, etc.) operate in some countries
as developed networks, functioning in complementarity with the dynamics of
market forces, negotiating over \market failures", and facilitating the working
of complex economic mechanisms.15 This co-ordinating role, i.e. the actual
operation of mechanisms of economic articulation, can occur in very dierent
institutional arrangements, and as \soft" or \hard" intervention. For that rea-
son, the quality of policy is a constant concern of the transaction cost approach.
While it is interested in these mechanisms from the allocation point of view,
the evolutionary approach is interested in terms of their role in the process of
knowledge accumulation.16
The policy practice of the OECD countries abounds in programs, grounded
on dierent principles, but which may all be labelled as neo-Schumpeterian,
and thus treated as applications of the evolutionary approach. Their implicit
15 The fact that the Japanese aluminium industry was, within three years, able to reduce
its capacities by 50% cannot be explained either by the high quality of market incentives in
relation to other countries or by strong government intervention, but only in terms of highly
developed \mechanisms of economic articulation". The example of the German Social Market
Economy shows how rich the network of decentralized links between business and government
can be. Great Britain, by contrast, is centralized but \economically non-articulated" because
it has weak mechanisms of economic articulation [Robertson (1992)].
16 The dierence between these two views can be interpreted in the following way. The
transaction cost view oers a negative explanation of the existence of institutions, claiming
that activities have to be integrated because they cannot be separated on account of high
transaction (governance) costs. The evolutionary view gives a positive explanation of the
existence of institutions, claiming that activities have to be integrated because of synergies
between them which lead to the improvement of competences [Foray (1993)].
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basis is the perception that the complexities of competitive situations cannot
be reduced to textbook situations where divergences between private and so-
cial protabilities can be discerned easily, and appropriate levels of temporary
intervention determined. This perception must be at least as appropriate for
Eastern Europe. However strong the incentives are, if they do not address key
deciencies they will fail to eect changes. Remember that in a neo-classical
world the problem of capabilities does not exist. Any price change instantly en-
sures the appropriate supply of capabilities. In conditions of actual transition,
gradual adjustment of incentives to rms' capabilities, i.e. processes of adjust-
ment on a micro level, are essential. The experience of East European countries,
where some enterprises have been and are still exposed to \big bang" shocks
(Poland) while others have undergone a more gradual process of marketization
(Hungary), clearly conrms this. When the shock is too big, threatening the
very survival of the rm in its existing form, it eectively hinders adjustment
[see Estrin et al. (1993)].
2.4. Neo-classical, transactional and evolutionary approaches to technology
policy in the context of Eastern Europe
In this part I will try to esh out the practical policy implications of these
dierent theoretical frameworks for East European technology policies:
2.4.1. The neo-classical view
The essence of this view lies in the principle that changes in relative prices
should be marginal, so that they can perform their allocative function, and the
belief that where the price system in general is heavily distorted, individual
prices cannot allocate resources eciently. Therefore a rational cost/benet
approach to estimating the (in)appropriateness of intervention in any given
case is infeasible. In practice the various alternative policy instruments have to
be ranked according to the criteria (subjective) of the intensity of distortions
of relative prices that they produce (hierarchical approach) [Corden (1974)].
It is clearly of immense importance to establish allocative price eciency in
Eastern Europe. The region presents an extreme example of the misguided use
of the price structure as a means of achieving national goals, such as is observed
in many developing countries. [Cody et al. (1990)]. In that context the neo-
classical view delivers a salutary warning on the welfare eects of excessive
intervention.
However, in addition to their allocative function, prices also full the func-
tion of adaptation mechanisms, i.e. conveyors of structural change. If coun-
tries and enterprises had always been constrained by the principles of sta-
tic allocative eciency, they would never have managed to exploit dynamic
competitive advantages. So, a certain degree of distortion seems indispens-
able for promoting structural change. Certainly, empirical research suggests
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that policy-induced distortions should be held at a minimal level [Dornbusch
(1990)]. However, in the light of the degree of environmental degradation in
Eastern Europe, for example, it is dicult to see how environmental concerns
could be reconciled with the objective of minimal price distortions.
2.4.2. Transaction cost approach
The transaction cost perspective is very revealing in any East European policy-
formation context today. In conditions of radical or \structural" uncertainties,
transaction costs probably reach their extreme values. In that kind of sit-
uation, old style \co-ordination" and S&T policy, emanating only from the
public authorities, does not work. Any successful new policy must rely for its
implementation on private actors and on their entrepreneurial abilities. How-
ever, pure supply side programs that \deliver" needed services to users are too
expensive in relation to current nancial possibilities. Eastern Europe today
needs very innovative, low-budget programs in technology policy, programs
that will involve a large number of actors. The \private production of public
goods" approach should be a high priority for policy-makers.17
The transaction cost theory argues that there are no areas that are pre-
destined, a priori, for either public or private action. That proposition can
be interpreted as positing that there is no public program which cannot be
implemented by private agents.18 Alternatively, schemes could be based on
public/private co-operation. This is an extremely important point on account
of the low administrative capability in Eastern Europe to implement public
policy|in the S&T area or any other area. Here is a policy area, and a part
of the world, where governance costs could be extraordinarily high.
2.4.3. The evolutionary view
This approach focuses on activities that increase dynamic externalities and
interdependencies, complementarities and connectivity within the techno-
economic system. The emphasis is much more on diusion, and on increasing
competencies in key sectors and technologies. The implication is that policy
should be concerned not only with nancial (neo-classical) and institutional
(transactionist) eciency, but equally with the quality of the relationships be-
tween dierent S&T activities, viewed as an integral process.
The evolutionary/neo-Schumpeterian approach to S&T policy assumes that
changes in relative prices (either \natural" or policy-created) do not automat-
ically lead to changes in enterprise behaviour.19 While in a neo-classical world
17 A very stimulating paper which develops this approach is Demsetz (1970).
18 See Coase (1974) for a revealing account of this kind of problem.
19 For a wider discussion of this approach and its application in the case of Brazil, see
Schmitz and Cassiolato (1992).
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every divergence between desired and actual is solved through prices, in a neo-
Schumpeterian world such divergence is seen as a complex phenomenon whose
essence lies in decient capability. In the conditions of high uncertainty and
mutually exclusive alternative paths of growth which prevail today in Eastern
Europe, pure market solutions will fail because purely price-based incentives
will be insucient.20
Neo-classical theorising assumes the automatism of learning, whatever the
problem. The neo-Schumpeterian view posits that learning is specic, whether
in relation to organizational, technological, nancial or marketing spheres. The
essence of restructuring problems may lie less in the nancial and production
spheres as such, than in the weaknesses of the external environment (lack of
complementary markets, negative externalities) or in deciencies of information
and knowledge, in a high degree of uncertainty, etc. To achieve the rst-
best solution, it is necessary to be completely familiar with the challenges and
prospects of competitiveness of a given sector. These challenges and prospects
are not standardized, and cannot be reduced to problems with specic inputs
(factors) which can be solved by equilibrating prices through competition, or
through temporary divergence of prices from equilibrium levels.
An important corollary of all this is that there is plenty of room for policy
interventions that are not limited exclusively to nancial incentives. Japan,
for instance, reports the lowest level of nancial transfers (subsidies, tax de-
ductions) from the government to industry in the OECD, in the context of
very sophisticated industrial policy [OECD (1987)]. The co-ordination and
information functions of technology and industrial policy are often the most
important. Again, the successful economies demonstrate the important role
of informal mechanisms, and of very loose co-ordinating mechanisms, which
function as policy instruments par excellence.
3. Sectoral restructuring and the need for strategic technology
policy: The case of Croatia
Capabilities are located in rms, groups of rms (networks) and sectors. These
are also the places where weaknesses in capabilities can be most easily identied
20 This point is well argued by Justman and Teubal (1992, p. 3): \The distinction emerges
most sharply when the economy is at a node of structural change andmust choose from among
a set of discrete, mutually exclusive, alternative paths for growth. In such circumstances
market failure is endemic: not only is there no reason to assume that the market will choose
the best path|or even identify the elements of infrastructure that are necessary for growth
when they are needed . . . but market failure analysis alone cannot identify a `preferred' path
of growth. . . . Even when the appropriate path for growth has been determined, getting
on this path may take more than just the price based incentives|subsidies, tax credits|on
which technology policy has mostly relied in the past. It may require co-ordination and
co-operation among potential users of the new technological infrastructure in determining
which elements are necessary and should be supported. And in some cases, co-ordination of
supply and demand will be needed."
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and addressed. I will use material from three sectors of the Croatian economy
to illustrate the kind of problems that require for their solution the application
of strategic technology policy. I believe these case studies to be rather typical
for Eastern Europe.
3.1. The textile and garments industry21
The textile and garments industry is the biggest Croatian exporter. It consists
of 119 enterprises of very dierent sizes, which together account for 16% of all
industrial employment. The 15 biggest enterprises contribute more than 50%
of aggregate sales in the sector. The total annual value of exports is $743 mn
(1992), representing 18.5% of total Croatian exports, of which straightforward
export of goods is worth just $195 mn. The dierence is exports through
the so-called \loan", or \putting out" business, whereby the buyer supplies
the producer with material inputs and specications [Hobday (1993)]. The
domestic producer thus sells its work services. In conditions of chronic foreign
currency shortage and low quality of domestic inputs, this method of doing
business has become widespread in the textile and garments sector.
Over the last 40 years, the garments industry has been unprotected in the
domestic market. In addition to that, it has never enjoyed preferential access
to cheap credits. This has created a special incentive to export, simply in order
to survive. Firms have entered into OEM (original equipment manufacturer)
arrangements with foreign, mainly German, partners, under which Croatian
goods have been sold under German brand names. This has enabled them to
develop, over the last 30 years, a pattern of competitiveness that emulates some
characteristics of export-led growth, albeit at a relatively slower pace [Hobday
(1993)].
Croatian textiles and garments rms have learned to produce quality prod-
ucts based on the seller's specications. From the mastery of simple produc-
tion requirements, they moved gradually to more complex specications, and
acquired the ability to meet tight deadlines. The best of them have developed
design capabilities, and are developing marketing capabilities through search
for an appropriate niche strategy.
The key factors of success here are:
{ experience and good quality, developed through learning by exporting;
{ a well-qualied technical work force with know-how acquired through learn-
ing by doing;
{ long-term links with foreign buyers (trading houses).
21 This and the following two sections are based on studies produced as part of the project:
The Competitiveness of Croatia, led by the author. The study of the Croatian textile and
garments industry is based on Knezevic (1993).
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The enterprises display very heterogeneous degrees of vertical integration.
Some are fully integrated with their own yarn production, while others pur-
chase all inputs on the domestic market or through \loan" arrangements. The
textile segment is made up of technically very varied elements: some plants
are quite modern, while others have rather outdated equipment. The compet-
itiveness of the textile segment is on average much below that of the garment
segment, which represents a structural disadvantage weakening the overall ex-
port strength of the sector.
Further development of industry is dependent on:
{ orientation to marketing and close relations with buyers;
{ capacity to satisfy requirements of small buyers;
{ ability to meet delivery schedules;
{ scope for prompt purchase of all required components.
Further development of the industry is likely to evolve from production
towards design and marketing capabilities. To do this, however, the rms will
have to overcome the following weaknesses:
{ poor utilization of materials;
{ problems in the supply of tools;
{ lack of specialized equipment;
{ undeveloped marketing capabilities.
These weaknesses would be overcome more rapidly if there were a market for
infrastructural services (marketing rms, quality services, technical information
centres). The current reality is that enterprises operate in a poor environment
as far as information and services are concerned, and cannot rely on external
support. Their production capabilities have developed steadily over the years,
and do not represent a major problem. However, the lack of complementary
markets (quality control services, marketing companies, technical information
services) hampers their further advance. Support for the development of com-
plementary markets would strengthen what is still only a shallow textile and
garment cluster [Porter (1990)]. Such support would enable them to move
into higher-value-added segments, where non-price factors are dominant. This
would further improve the state of the textile segment and deepen the cluster.
The process of evolution of the industry will continue, irrespective of pol-
icy actions. The fact remains that the enterprises involved have few mutual
links, their industry association is weak, and they rely too much on individual
eorts to improve marketing capabilities. There is already signicant poten-
tial demand for the kind of infrastructural services that the Croatian textiles
and garments sector needs, and for the co-ordination of production, nancial
and marketing activities. Here is an obvious case where support for devel-
opment of a market for infrastructural services, and for improving enterprise
co-ordination, is badly needed.
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3.2. Petrochemicals22
The Croatian petrochemical industry is a legacy of the Yugoslav import substi-
tution strategy of the 1970s. Unlike the textiles and garments industry, which
grew up as a result of comparative advantage, and of the subsequent generation
of dynamic competitive advantages, the petrochemicals industry was created
through a series of strategic decisions at the top level. It was the result of a
desire for structural change and independence from imports of petrochemicals.
The biggest investments were made after the Oil Shock (1976{82), when world
prices rendered such investments for a country dependent on oil imports very
dubious. However, at the micro level the investments seemed rational because
the structure of domestic relative prices was highly distorted by over-valued
exchange rates, cheap foreign loans and the predominant import-substituting
pattern of development. The debt crisis at the beginning of 1980s, followed as
it was by a deep economic crisis which deprived the industry of the investments
needed to complete the petrochemical chain, changed the situation dramati-
cally. As exports were forced, in order to service Yugoslavia's foreign debt
during the eighties, the full scale of the sector's problems began to emerge.
Those problems were greatly exacerbated by signicant structural changes in
the world petrochemicals industry itself.
Up until the Oil Crisis, the development of the petrochemicals industry
was based on cheap raw materials. The following trends have reshaped the
structure of the industry since then:
a) increases in raw material prices have led to a change in the structure of
xed and variable costs. From a ratio of 70:30 at the beginning of the 1970s
this had gone to 30:70 by the beginning of the 1980s. As a result, the
price of petrochemicals became much more dependent on the price of crude
oil. Lack of long-term supply arrangements puts the Croatian sector into a
particularly unfavourable position, by making it highly vulnerable to price
swings and temporal patterns of purchasing;
b) the development of new technologies have led to increasing eciency in the
use of raw materials, energy and equipment;
c) global recession has had a particularly injurious eect on an industry which
is heavily dependent on trends in GDP;
d) the pressure for downstream integration coming from the oil-producing
countries has posed a serious threat to the competitive prospects of coun-
tries like Croatia;
e) ecological pressures have produced demands for restructuring towards eco-
logically benign products.
These trends have led most countries to restructure away from conven-
tional/bulk commodity segments into specialized, value-added chemicals.23
22 This section is based on Cimesa, Sekulic, and Antunac (1993).
23 Thus for Dow Chemicals 50% of production and 80% of prots were coming from spe-
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The key factors of success in conventional petrochemicals are low production
costs, low transport costs, ecient process technology and scale economies.
In speciality chemicals the key factors of success are R&D, marketing and
services. Current forecasts for conventional petrochemicals are rather gloomy,
particularly for small players.
These trends have found the Croatian petrochemical industry weighed
down by import substitution investment patterns, with the export structure
92.9% dominated by conventional petrochemical products like polyethylene,
polystyrene and fertilisers. Current exports (1992) are mainly based on short-
term contracts (69%), long-term co-operation (4.7%), re-export (23.1%) and
\loan" export (2.1%). It should be emphasised that the price competitiveness
of Croatian petrochemicals exports is at the level of other non-OECD countries.
On the domestic side, the sector's main problems are:
{ imbalances between production capacities and absorptive capacities on the
domestic market side caused by the loss of the former Yugoslav market;
{ technological obsolescence of equipment;
{ imbalances in the production chain, leading to re-export and re-import;
{ at best partial security of supply;
{ lack of nance for investment (modernization and restructuring).
The availability of a qualied labour force and the rapid rate of absorption
of technical assistance during the build-up phase, led to dynamic eciency
gains in the early stages of development of conventional petrochemicals. Some
conrmation of this can be found in the development of the export of techni-
cal services to some Arab countries. However, structural changes, sub-optimal
capacities, reduction of the size of the domestic market, and lack of funds
to completing the production chain, have all resulted in a subsequent loss of
these dynamic eciency gains. The only way that the problems of conventional
petrochemicals can be resolved is through long-term supply arrangements, tech-
nical modernization and new investment to bring the production chain into
balance. The amount of investment needed is around $500 mn, which is way
beyond the resources of the industry. Even if investment funds could be found,
it remains uncertain whether they would be paid o through exports.
The industry has two parallel strategic options:
{ restructuring through a state-supported program, or through foreign priva-
tization;
{ reorientation towards specialized chemicals, i.e. moving into higher value-
added segments.
It would be unreasonable to expect that the industry could make such a
strategic choice by itself. The most market-friendly solution would be foreign
privatization. However, it is very unlikely that a foreign partner would be
ciality chemicals by 1992.
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willing to take over the whole sector. Domestic privatization can only have
a marginal eect. A \hands o" policy on the part of government is also
infeasible, as the sector is currently in public ownership and a monopolist,
with a potentially high drainage eect on the budget.
On the other hand, bureaucratic involvement in strategic business decisions
might increase costs, and lead to further failures. The nal outcome will prob-
ably be the result of the interplay between the interests of potential foreign
investors, government actions, and managers' ability to implement strategic
changes.
The type of policy that might pay o in the context of such a high level of
strategic uncertainty is conditional assistance. The government could provide
funds for restructuring, or actively search for and negotiate foreign sources for
the nancing of restructuring. The conditional assistance would be tempo-
rary, and would be linked to the fullment of certain performance indicators
(productivity, export, quality, etc.). The role of the government should be one
of mild, rather than strong involvement. Final solutions of highly complex
problems should be left to the industry's management. However, temporary
and performance-conditioned nancial assistance has a role to play in exerting
pressure, and inducing `stick and carrot' behaviour.
Assistance might also extend to facilitation of the shift towards speciality
chemicals. But this would be a special kind of assistance. Its precise strategic
direction could only be identied after a degree of progress in conventional
petrochemicals restructuring had been made.
From the strategic technology policy perspective, it is important to bear in
mind that the problems of Croatian petrochemicals sector are not solely prob-
lems of technological capability. The restructuring of low-value petrochemicals,
the shift towards speciality chemicals, puts market considerations to the fore.
Restructuring policy must link together technological and marketing and nan-
cial aspects of the problem.
3.3. Pharmaceuticals24
While the textile industry grew as a result of comparative advantage, and the
petrochemicals industry as the outcome of an import-substitution strategy, the
pharmaceutical industry has developed as a result of competitive advantage.
It is one of the few R&D based sectors in Croatia. Its growth is the result
of domestic demand and the available science base (university, independent
research institutes), which were successfully coupled with the eorts of the
biggest national pharmaceutical company. Relative technological isolation of
the pharmaceutical sector from other sectors has facilitated successful interac-
tion within this small cluster.
24 This section is based on de Villa (1993).
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On the basis of its developed \in house" R&D capability, the leading domes-
tic pharmaceutical company, which makes 90% of Croatian output, succeeded
in developing its rst antibiotic, and licensing it to Pzer. It also successfully
produced a long chain of generics.
The annual sales of the Croatian pharmaceutical industry are $250 mn
(1991), of which 33.2% is exported. Of total exports of $84 mn, bulk active
elements make up $44 mn (93% of production) and nal products $37.4 mn
(19%). The domestic market is small, and is divided between two domestic
(38% and 15%), two Slovenian (23% and 19%) and one German (5%) company.
The Croatian pharmaceutical industry produces around 40 pharmaceutical
raw materials, azitromycin and vitamin C being the most important. It does
not produce \over the counter drugs"(OTC) but rather generics. These are
exported to less demanding markets, primarily East European. Bulk pharma-
ceuticals are exported to the West. The key factors for success in the industry
are: knowledge, experience and tradition, and human resources.
The domestic production program of the Croatian pharmaceuticals industry
has diversied as the result of import substitution demands from the national
health authorities. Most of the products are made under licensing agreements,
with corresponding restrictions on export sales. Following the opening up of
the former Soviet markets, the industry has experienced great diculties in
exporting its licensed products.
The complete breakdown of the old market structure occurred during the
on-going process of polarization of the world pharmaceutical industry, involving
consolidation and mergers of big companies, accompanied by the growth of
market niches lled by specialized small companies. With big rms diversifying,
and small rms specializing, producing so-called \orphan drugs", medium-sized
companies (like Croatia's leading company) are in danger of being squeezed by
the high-prole companies.
The bargaining power of the industry in international markets is small.
The entry barriers in OTC products are insurmountable, on account of high
R&D and marketing costs. The current strategic thrusts|OEM export of raw
materials to Western markets and export of generics to Eastern, on top of the
increasing import substitution demands of the domestic market|have limited
dynamic eects. The industry has the choice of either becoming a subsidiary
of one of the big pharmaceutical companies, or transforming itself into a small
niche producer. These strategic decisions should not in any way be inuenced
by policy-makers outside the industry. However, it is crucial that the industry
receive indirect support in whatever strategic decision it takes. In the case
of the pharmaceutical industry, the best support would be support for R&D.
Technology policy would strengthen links between industry and universities.
It would also give support to the internationalization of R&D eorts through
fostering co-operation in international projects. The precise forms of R&D co-
operation should be negotiated between companies, universities, independent
institutes and the Ministry of S&T.
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4. Strategic technology policy for Eastern Europe25
In the rst part of this section I will try to generalize on the basis of the three
Croatian sectors studied. Then, in the second part, I try to adduce the main
principles for the application of STRTP in Eastern Europe.
4.1. Sector-specic types of strategic technology policy for Eastern Europe
Capabilities, which I have described as the main targets of strategic technology
policy, are usually sector-specic. However, some capabilities are so widespread
that they can be addressed as industry-wide, or even economy-wide, problems.
Capabilities like quality control, information system-building and inventory
management, for example, are generic techniques which are applicable in all
sectors. However, even they are usually sector-specic in detailed implemen-
tation. For that reason, I shall concentrate on sector-specic STRTP though
without prejudice to the importance of functional STRTP.26
The design of STRTP in dierent sectors is based on the specicities of
sectoral technological capability, and their relation with the production and
science system. The assumption is that the prole of technological capabilities
determines the specic strategic technology policy approach. This assumption
underlies the distinction between production know-how based sectors, engineer-
ing based and R&D based sectors (for a summary see Table 1).
Table 1
Sectoral strategic technology policies for Eastern Europe
Type of sector Type of strategic technology policy
Production know-how based Building markets for infrastructural services
Engineering based Conditional assistance
Network creation problem
SMEs as subcontractors
R&D based Academy-industry links
- Co-operative projects
- International co-operation
- R&D management capability
25 The analysis contained in this section is addressed particularly to the smaller East
European states like Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Latvia,
Estonia, and Lithuania.
26 Justman and Teubal (1992) attach particular importance to the distinction between
sectoral and functional STRTP.
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The taxonomy that is suggested here tries to link STRTP activities with the
dominant sources of technology accumulation. It is not primarily a taxonomy
of innovations, as in Bell and Pavitt (1993) and Pavitt (1984), but rather of
policies.
4.1.1. Know-how based sectors
By know-how based sectors I mean industries in which technological capability
is nested in production, i.e. in the knowledge of workers and technicians. These
are traditional industries (textiles, wood, classical machine tools) or services
like tourism. Here the problem of capabilities does not, in principle, exist.
Production capability has been mastered, and the main problem is to move
into higher value-added segments. This move implies upgrading of production
capabilities, which is a part of the natural trajectory of enterprises. Examples
include industries like textiles in Poland, food and beverages in Bulgaria, the
wood industry in Slovenia, etc.
The most common situation in the region is one where there is no developed
domestic market for services for upgrading production capability in know-how
based sectors. The process of building this market could develop without public
action. However, a purely market-driven evolution will take too long, and will
be less eective with respect to potential externalities that may develop through
networking.
The process can be speeded up by co-ordination between producers. This
problem is labelled by Justman and Teubal (1992) network creation type N1|
producer-producer links to exploit external services and complementary mar-
kets. Through facilitation of \user need determination", i.e., explicit eorts to
adapt to dierentiated user needs, the fundamental uncertainty regarding the
absence of a market for the services can be overcome. If there is any targeting,
then it is \infrastructure targeting". The process itself is market-driven. Sup-
port for this market should ultimately bear fruit in fully commercial services
purveyed by private enterprises. Those private enterprises may be created on
the basis of the small number of existing domestic private consulting companies
in Eastern Europe, which oer general services like accountancy and marketing,
or by privatizing parts of technical institutes which can oer various technical or
quality management services. These services may be subsidized on a decreasing
basis until the demand reaches the critical level for commercial protability.
4.1.2. Engineering based sectors
By engineering based industries I mean industries in which the technological ca-
pability is based on engineering activity.27 The communities around which the
27 This notion should not be confused with engineering as an industry. Here I use the term
engineering as a generic technological term covering machine-based problem-solving, whether
in the chemicals, mechanical engineering, software, or other industry.
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enterprises in these sectors operate are \hybrid communities". The enterprises
rely on R&D, the core of which comes from the \transfer sciences".28 These
are areas like mechanical engineering, automation, computer sciences, chemical
engineering|disciplines that play an essential role in establishing productive
relations between science and industry. The diculty in forming hybrid com-
munities is in straddling the conventional borders which separate \science" from
\technology". These interfaces are rich and complex institutionally, so that it
is a very complicated task to create corresponding networks. At the heart of
hybrid communities there usually lies a big national complex. The problem
in Eastern Europe is that that national complex is usually in a deteriorating
competitive situation.
It is in the engineering based industries that conditions in the East European
economies are now particularly unfavourable. These industries are usually the
heritage of past policies of import substitution, and are burdened by serious
competitiveness problems. Examples include the steel industry in Hungary and
the petrochemicals industry in Romania. Prospects for the revival of sectors
like these are especially gloomy in that the sectors are very \network intensive".
They require a large network of co-operating companies as subcontractors, and
also rely heavily on inputs from other industries. The general weaknesses of the
economies in question are very much felt in these sectors. The competitiveness
of the latter, such as it is, is very much of the \structural competitiveness"
type [OECD (1986)].
If engineering based sectors could be restructured during the initial phases
of transition, the eects would be widespread, and felt in a large number of
linked sectors. However, these sectors are the most demanding to restructure
in all respects (technical, nancial), and it is in practice very unlikely that
restructuring would start rst in these sector. There is, nevertheless, scope
here for a mixture of organizational and technological measures which could be
implemented through conditional assistance.
The heart of the typical restructuring problem in engineering based indus-
tries in Eastern Europe is a national industrial giant, or a few big enterprises,
where government cannot aord a hands-o policy. Direct governmental in-
volvement is called for|a very problematic requirement in Eastern Europe
today. But only through the restructuring of the core of a given network can
scope be created for follow-on indirect policies calculated to rejuvenate such
complex networks. So, an appropriate policy would have to combine very di-
rect intervention with very indirect. The complexity of the network creation
problem in these sectors is reected in the fact that, in Justman/Teubal's ter-
minology, the relevant networks here are of both types|N1 and N2|between
similar producers, as well as between supplier and assembler or core company
and subcontractor.
28 Transfer sciences are elds that straddle the normal borders separating \science" from
\technology". For a discussion of the role of transfer sciences see OECD (1992) and Blume
(1990).
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4.1.3. R&D based sectors
R&D based sectors are sectors in which core technical capabilities represent the
result of an organized research process. Here production is the legacy of big
R&D investments in the past, which have left pockets of competency in indus-
try. In Eastern Europe these isolated islands of capability typically developed
in areas where the need for market interaction was smaller, and where demand
was high and exacting in spite of a generally undeveloped market. Typically,
this was either in defence sectors, or in pharmaceuticals, where demand from
health systems was the driving force.
Uncertainty with regard to potential demand is the dominant feature of this
sector. While in the know-how based sector production capabilities exist, and
the structure of demand is well known, in the R&D based sector the case is the
opposite. The pattern of demand has to be researched, production and R&D
capabilities improved, and links with academia strengthened.
Co-operation with potential users or buyers (user-producer links) is of es-
sential importance here. It can best be developed through pre-competitive
projects, or through any other form of industry-academy collaboration.
The network here is, in the Justman/Teubal terminology, of the N2 type
(user-producer). The approach therefore needs to be project-oriented. The
main policy problem is how to link project denition to the needs of industry.
Project denition is very much under the inuence of the scientic community,
which is of course governed by its own objectives. One possible way of coupling
industry and academia is through technology foresight exercises.29
4.2. General principles and issues in the implementation of strategic technology
policy for Eastern Europe
I view strategic technology policy as an indispensable bridge between science
and industrial policy, and between them and competition policy. Science policy,
focused as it is on the knowledge base and institutional R&D, has limited lever-
age by itself on the technological weaknesses in enterprises. In similar fashion,
general technology policy, which creates general conditions for S&T develop-
ment, does not necessarily address crucial deciencies in sectoral capabilities.
For example, innovation centres as a generalized solution for all sectors do not
make much sense. And if you want STRTP to have an impact, a developed
competition policy which would prevent monopolies, and ensure liberal trade
regimes and healthy competition is de rigeur.
However, East European countries also need structural change, and this
cannot be eected fast enough, if at all, by market forces alone. The complexity
of the situation is compounded by the fact that any kind of active industrial
policy, which presumes huge transfers within or between industries, would be
29 A strategic shift in S&T policy based on technology foresight is one of the key points of
the new UK White Paper on S&T; see HMSO (1993).
110 slavo radosevic
untenable in Eastern Europe. Structural change must, therefore, be combined
with openness and a liberal environment. Activities of the STRTP type are
the only kinds of policy action that could be expected to resist the pressures
of the sectoral lobbying and special pleading which currently so dominate the
political life of the East European countries|and even then only under certain
conditions.
4.2.1. Strategic technology policy design is context- (industry-)specic
In order to ensure the rst-best solution it is necessary to know the key factors
of success or failure of industry and industries in particular countries.30 These
are not standardized, and cannot be reduced to the equilibration of factor prices
or temporary distortions in factor prices.
4.2.2. Strategic technology policy is seldom feasible as a separate, self-sucient
policy
As technological capabilities are intertwined with nancial, marketing and
other capabilities, strategic technology policy is in practice very often a com-
ponent of a restructuring package.
4.2.3. Because STRTP is by denition strategic, its formulation is inseparable
from its implementation
The parties concerned rarely have any clear idea in advance of the details of the
policies they want to pursue.31 It is precisely in the course of interaction that
better understanding of key problems is acquired and a consensus reached.
4.2.4. STRTP is not solely supply-side or demand-side
Indeed its formulation and implementation could be summed up as a process
of coupling demand and supply.
30 The need to understand industry-specic key factors of success, as a basis for \bench
marking" national industries is an explicit aim of the new UK industrial policy. Michael
Heseltine, UK trade and industry secretary, puts it this way: \Information is critical. Because
on the quality of the information we gather, the respect of industry depends. If we are known
to understand, to be aware, to have views that are coherent, thought through, well-informed,
then industry will take this department seriously : : : : We are constantly being asked for
project launch aid and I would expect people here advising ministers to be experts in leading
edge technology, knowing where it is going to be in 10 years time." See: \Heseltine's plan to
help Britain win", Financial Times, April 26, 1993.
31 The EC Open Microprocessor System Initiative (OMI) is a good example of how a diverse
range of interests, involving even competing companies, can evolve into a coherent European
program. This case is a good example of STRTP, and of the inseparability of formulation and
implementation, with an initially completely misaligned set of players managing to regroup
into the programmatic alignment of a capability-building initiative; see Molina (1993).
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4.2.5. STRTP requires developed administrative capability and close co-
operation between public administration and the business community
This is the biggest problem for STRTP in Eastern Europe and the condition
most dicult to meet. The inherited inert and bureaucratic machine could
misuse STRTP in order to demonstrate the need for its continued existence.
By the same token, a STRTP program could be exploited by big enterprises as
just another source of subsidies.
These problems could to a degree be overcome through policy transparency.
The peculiar historical and cultural heritage of Eastern Europe presents a real
danger of \government failure". Societies that were overburdened by excessive
co-ordinative activities now tend to neglect them. This pattern, accompanied as
it has been by the objective uncertainties of institutional change and instability,
has led to confusion and extreme forms of \short-termism".
Such a situation clearly cries out for co-ordination activities. However, in
the real policy arena of Eastern Europe it is dicult not to cross the \red
line", beyond which the whole question of co-ordination becomes deja vu. The
whole is particularly problematic in sectors where the market is the superior
learning engine because of its ability to generate rapid trial and error learning
(know-how based sectors, R&D based sectors) [Langlois (1992)].
The main problem of STRTP in the given context is, then, feasibility and
implementation rather than justication|or as Dosi puts it more generally, the
argument against intervention is not an economic one, but an administrative
and political one [UNCTAD (1993)].
4.2.6. The only way out of the impasse is strong competition policy and open-
ness in foreign trade32
Otherwise the application of STRTP, in conditions of monopoly and high entry
barriers, may simply be hi-jacked by rent-seekers and lobbyists.
Small Eastern European economies cannot apply a Japanese-type approach
to the problem, namely combining temporary protection with erce domestic
competition. This is why an open trade regime is indispensable for creating
incentive pressures in Eastern Europe. But by the same token, the more market
pressure is introduced, the more these countries need mechanisms of the STRTP
type which will strengthen rms' capabilities. What STRTP must not do is
to produce distortions in macro prices which might then inhibit the forces of
market selection. Such distortions can be tolerated only temporarily, in order
to restructure engineering based industries for which nancial requirements are
very high. Note, however, that full trade openness should ensure the selective
eciency of markets even in these cases.
32 STRTP implicitly assumes that the power of market resides, not in its allocative e-
ciency, but in its selective eciency. The point is emphasised by Dosi in UNCTAD (1993).
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4.2.7. The cost of applying STRTP in Eastern Europe would not be a major
problem
Except in the case of the engineering based sectors, STRTP would be much
cheaper than the currently widespread system of cheap loans for big enter-
prises, which continues to function as an implicit industrial policy and acts
as a major nancial drain on the domestic banking system. A second source
of nance would be the restructuring of the existing mechanisms for nancing
basic, applied and strategic research.
4.2.8. Dierent competitive situations in dierent sectors require dierent ap-
proaches
STRTP oers no general policy solution which can be applied across all sectors.
In other words, there is no blueprint for policy makers. For that reason, policy
itself becomes a highly information- and knowledge-intensive activity, as well as
an intensive social networking activity [Radosevic (1992)]. This underlines the
very strong information function of STRTP, a function which requires intensive
ows of tacit or semi-codied information.33 These are easier to handle through
informal arrangements, or through networks.
5. Conclusions
We have discussed and developed STRPT as a practical concept in the context
of dierent theoretical approaches to technology policy. While Eastern Europe
has been a particular focus of attention, our conclusions have general validity.
The main conclusion is that STRTP is \evolutionary-economic" in charac-
ter, but that in its application in Eastern Europe it should incorporate some
of the features of the transaction costs and neo-classical approaches.
Theoretical constructs cannot be applied directly in policy practice. Indeed,
because of problems of consistency and applicability, the various theoretical
approaches can function only as useful heuristic devices that capture dierent,
but complementary, aspects of the technology policy problematic, such as seem
to me to be relevant today in Eastern Europe. These aspects are summarized
in Table 2.
33 This problem is explicitly tackled by the UK Department of Trade and Industry's new
competitiveness policy. \The intention is to use the DTI divisions as a conduit between DTI
and industry and as a source of quality market intelligence to assist competitiveness at home
and overseas : : : : The ambition, according to a senior ocial with responsibility for some of
the industry divisions, is to make them so informed and knowledgeable that the private sector
will value their contribution." See \Where the main thrust of the DTI's new competitive
policy will be focused", Financial Times, April 26, 1993.
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Table 2
Policy characteristics
of dierent theoretical approaches
Focus Usefulness Problems
Neo-classical nancial high misleading
intervention anti-distortionary state/market
bias dichotomy
Transaction cost costs of alternative static in
intervention mechanisms of character
implementation
Evolutionary dynamic eects potential for indeterminacy
of intervention promoting
struct. change
In practice STRTP seems a \high risk operation". It requires the simul-
taneous presence of competitive markets, highly developed administrative ca-
pabilities and developed networks of collective mechanisms|\mechanisms of
economic articulation". It also requires favourable internal (education level)
and external conditions (access to world markets). The essence of the STRTP
policy problem is to build a rich network of co-operation mechanisms in the
context of erce competition. This is not something that derives readily from
the experience of the East European countries.
References
Arrow, Kenneth J., Economic Welfare and the Inventive Activity, Washington D.C.,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1962.
Bator, M. Francis, \The anatomy of market failure", Quarterly Journal of Economics,
72, August 1958, pp. 351{379.
Bell, Martin, and Keith Pavitt, \Technological accumulation and industrial growth:
Contrasts between developed and developing countries", Industrial and
Corporate Change, 2, 2, 1994, pp. 157{210.
Blume, Stuart, \Transfer sciences: Their conceptualisation, functions and assess-
ment", paper prepared for the TEP Indicators Conference, OECD, Paris,
July 1990.
Cimesa, Miljenko, Gordana Sekulic, and Oskar Antunac, \Konkurentnost petrokemije
Hrvatske", (The competitiveness of the Croatian petrochemicals industry),
Ekonomski institut, Zagreb, 1993.
114 slavo radosevic
Coase, Ronald H., \The lighthouse in economics", Journal of Law and Economics,
17, October 1974, pp. 357{376.
Cody, John, Richard Kuitchen, and John Weiss, Policy Design and Price Reform in
Developing Countries. Guidelines With Special Reference to Industry, New
York and London, Harvester and Wheatsheaf, 1990.
Corden, Max, Trade Policy and Economic Welfare, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974.
Cowling, Thomas, and Harry Tomman (eds.), Industrial Policy After 1992: An Anglo-
German Perspective, London, Anglo German Foundation, 1990.
Dahlman, Carl, \The problem of externality", Journal of Law and Economics, 22,
April 1979, pp. 141{162.
Demsetz, Harold, \The exchange and enforcement of property rights", Journal of Law
and Economics, 7, October 1964, pp. 11{26.
Demsetz, Harold, \Information and eciency: Another viewpoint", Journal of Law
and Economics, 12, 1969, pp. 1{23.
Demsetz, Harold, \The private production of public goods", Journal of Law and
Economics, 13, October 1970, pp. 293{306.
Dornbusch, R"udiger, \Policies to move from stabilisation to growth", in: Proceedings
of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1990,
Washington D.C., The World Bank, 1990, pp. 19{58.
Estrin, Saul, Alan Gelb, and Inderjit Singh, \Restructuring, viability and privatisa-
tion: A comparative study of enterprise adjustment in transition", London
Business School, mimeo, 1993.
Foray, Dominique, and Christopher Freeman (eds.), Technology and the Wealth of
Nations: The Dynamics of Constructed Advantage, London and New York,
Pinter Publishers and OECD, 1993.
Freeman, Christopher, and Bengt A. Lundvall (eds.), Small Countries Facing Tech-
nological Revolution, London, Pinter Publishers, 1988.
HMSO, Realising our Potential: A Strategy for Science, Engineering and Technology,
London, May 1993.
Hobday, Mike, \Export led technology development in the four dragons: The case of
electronics", SPRU, mimeo, Brighton, 1993.
Justman, Moshe, and Morris Teubal, \A framework to an explicit industry and tech-
nology policy for Israel and some specic proposals", in: Freeman, Christo-
pher, and Bengt A. Lundvall (eds.), Small Countries Facing Technological
Revolution, London, Pinter Publishers, 1988.
Justman, Moshe, and Morris Teubal, \Strategic technology policy for new indus-
trial infrastructure: Creating capabilities and building new markets", The
Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, discussion paper, 25, Jerusalem,
1992.
Knezevic, Ana, \Konkurentnost tekstilne i odjevne industrije Hrvatske", (The com-
petitiveness of the Croatian garment and textile industry), Ekonomski in-
stitut, Zagreb, 1993.
Krugman, Paul R. (ed.), Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics,
Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1988.
Lieberman, Ira, \The restructuring enterprise", in: OECD, The Transition to a Mar-
ket Economy. Part I, Paris, 1991, pp. 82{91.
strategic technology policy 115
Molina, Alfonso, \Insights into the successful generation of a large-scale European
initiative: From misalignment to programmatic alignment in the build up
of sociotechnical constituencies", paper presented at UK PICT National
Conference, Kenilworth, May 1993.
Nelson, Richard R., \The simple economics of basic scientic research", Journal of
Political Economy, 67, 1959, pp. 269{290.
OECD, \The notion of international competitiveness: A discussion paper",
DSTI/SPR/81/32, Paris, 1986.
OECD, Structural Adjustment and Economic Performance, Paris, 1987.
OECD, Technology-Economy Program: Key Relationships, Paris, 1992.
Pavitt, Keith, \Sectoral patterns of technical change: Towards a taxonomy and a
theory", Research Policy, 13, 1984, pp. 343{373.
Porter, Michael, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York, The Free Press,
1990.
Radosevic, Slavo, \Techno-economic networks and social intelligence as useful con-
cepts in technology policy making", in: Cronin, Bloise, and Nera Silovic
(eds.), From Information Management to Social Intelligence: The Key to
Open Markets, London, ASLIB, 1992, pp. 29{42.
Robertson, Neil, \Economic articulation: A neglected dimension of economic perfor-
mance?", Institute of Social Studies, ISS working paper series, 122, The
Hague, April 1992.
Schmitz, Hubert, and Jose Cassiolato (eds.), Hi-Tech for Industrial Development:
Lessons from the Brazilian Experience in Electronics and Automation, Lon-
don and New York, Routledge, 1992.
Sharp, Margaret, and Keith Pavitt, \Technology policy in the 1990s: Old trends and
new realities", Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, 2, 1993, pp. 129{
151.
Sorge, Arndt, \Introduction" to chapter IV (Institutional and technological change:
The importance of diversity), in: Foray, Dominique, and Christopher Free-
man (eds.), Technology and the Wealth of Nations: The Dynamics of Con-
structed Advantage, London and New York, Pinter Publishers and OECD,
1993.
Teece, David J., Gary Pisano, and Amy Shuen, \Firm capabilities, resources, and
the concept of strategy: Four paradigms in strategic management", CCC
working paper, December 1990.
UNCTAD, \Report of ad hoc expert group in technology policies in open developing
countries economies", ITD/TEC/3, Geneva, 1993.
de Villa, Zeljka Kordej, \Konkurentnost farmaceutske industrije Hrvatske", (The
competitiveness of the Croatian pharmaceutical industry), Ekonomski in-
stitut, Zagreb, 1993.
Winiecki, Jan, \Shaping the institutional structure", in: Siebert, Horst (ed.), Pri-
vatization: Symposium in Honour of Herbert Giersch, T"ubingen, J.C.B.
Mohr, 1992.
116 slavo radosevic
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Beitrag analysiert das Konzept der Strategischen Technologiepolitik (STRTP),
das urspr"unglich von Justman und Teubal entwickelt wurde, auf die Situation in
Osteuropa. Strategische Technologiepolitik wird hier als unerl,,aliches Bindeglied
zwischen Wissenschafts-, Industrie- und Wettbewerbspolitik angesehen. Strategische
Technologiepolitik zielt explizit auf eine Verbesserung technologischer M"glichkeiten
ab und basiert auf einer Koordination zwischen Gruppen von Unternehmen und der
Regierung. Das Konzept wird im Rahmen dreier verschiedener theoretischer Ans,,tze
an Technologiepolitik diskutiert, der Neoklassik, dem Transaktionskostenansatz, und
der evolution,,ren 2122konomie.
Die Analyse wird anschlieaend auf das Fallbeispiel Kroatien angewandt, wobei
zwischen drei Industriegruppen dierenziert wird, die sich in bezug auf ihre technol-
ogische Basis unterscheiden: Produktions-Know-How, Herstellung, bzw. Forschung
und Entwicklung. Die Schluafolgerung des Papiers lautet, daa eine STRPT-Politik
haupts,,chlich auf einem evolution,,ren Theorieverst,,ndnis beruhen mua, das unter
den spezischen osteurop,,ischen Bedingungen aber auch neoklassische Elemente und
solche der Transaktions"konomie beinhalten sollte.
